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NATIONALISM

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Efforts to understand the contemporary dimensions of nationalism must begin with the recognition of a seemingly peculiar fact: that despite two centuries of nationalist activity, influence, and imaginings, as well as an extensive literature that chronicles and analyzes all of this, there still exists no comprehensive definition of the vocabulary these actions inspired. *Nationalism, nationality, nation*—the power and resonance of these terms in practice is not matched by conceptual clarity. Indeed, as Benedict Anderson (2006) has pointed out, these words have proven more of an anomaly for theory than tools with which to sharpen our understanding of the tremendous impact of nationalism across social space and through historical time.

Moreover, dramatic changes in the arenas of politics, the economy, technology, and culture over the past few decades have placed nationalism in new contexts, contexts that have served mainly to further complicate the attempt to define it. The emergence of vast networks of international mobility and migration; stronger allegiances at the sub-, supra-, and transnational levels; the rise (and fall) of global finance and the convergence of international markets; major geopolitical transformations engendered by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the cold war, and the consolidation of the European Union; increasingly dense channels of global media—all have compromised the meanings formerly given to national borders and boundaries. Some enthusiasts, embracing global hopes and cosmopolitan ideals, have gone so far as to forecast the end of nationalism, seeing it as too limited, dangerous, or even morally wrong for a 21st-century global context.

Contrary to prognoses from several corners, however, nations and nationalism are not vanishing in a globally networked world. On the contrary, the outset of the 21st century has seen nation-states conserving their roles as central entities for political legitimacy, for the protection and rights of citizens, and for claims to cultural distinction. This century has also seen the other, darker side of nationalism, as when acts of violence and discrimination are committed in the name of national sovereignty or justice. In both cases, it is undeniable that populations continue to rely on national values, ideals, institutions, and interests for a sense of identity, to give meaning to their lives, and to structure the society of which they are a part.

In the context of political and civic leadership, nationalism can have a normative dimension. Nationalist leaders have long made claims directed toward the improvement of state or society, toward the necessity of consensus building, toward the mobilization of citizens for collective domestic projects, or toward the potential for sovereignty or self-determination. Understanding nationalism—its diverse processes, its structures, and its sites of political activity—is thus a vital component of political and civic leadership studies. Though it is important to understand the dimensions of nationalism in the contemporary moment—when various ideological and material shifts have complicated and challenged its relevance—it is equally crucial to understand nationalism as a historical phenomenon. As Ernest Renan (1882/1996) has observed, part of the work of nationalism is forgetting over time—whether forgetting older injustices to forge common national grounds or forgetting how what appears as "civic" or peaceful patriotism today has roots in both symbolic and physical forms of violence. This chapter therefore addresses historical patterns of nationalism as well as considering its role in current contexts of public leadership.

In this chapter, various dimensions of nationalism are explored in detail. The first section explores the meaning of nation and nationalism, charting the diverse and at times competing interpretations that have been advanced to define these terms. One of the major debates in the literature on nationalism is between those who see it as an extension of ancient ethnic identities and those who see it as distinctively modern. We argue here that, although some features are much older than others, the pattern we now recognize as nationalism is distinctive to the modern era. The second section of the chapter will discuss how nationalism figured in the formation of a new kind of political community linked to the rise of the modern state. Future directions for the study of nationalism as it pertains to political and civic leadership in the 21st century are then presented, focusing in particular on issues arising from patterns of globalization and cosmopolitanism. Finally, following a brief conclusion, we offer a list of key texts for further reading.

The Modernity and Diversity of Nationalisms

At its most basic, nationalism is the predilection of an individual or community for its own nation. But it is also a way of construing identity and belonging, a set of principles and practices, whether codified or not, that make individuals conscious of national selfhood. A distinction is often made between these two summary definitions, as if one were a "bad" kind of nationalism and the other a "good" kind. But a key aspect of understanding nationalism is in recognizing that both of these aspects are at play, and that there is no single definition that can encapsulate all the ways nationalism structures ideas of selfhood, belonging, and legitimacy across spaces and times.

Scholars and researchers have offered diverse and at times competing explanations of nationalism. Some, like Anthony Smith (2001), see it as the product of enduring ethnic identities stemming from cultural traits such as language; in this view, nationalism is a phenomenon as much of the ancient world as of the modern one. In contrast, some attribute the rise of nationalism to a series of political and cultural changes stemming from industrialism, as in Ernest Gellner's (1983) work, or from capitalism, as in the extensive writings by Hobsbawm (1992)—or some combination thereof. A third strain of thinking, discussed by Hechter, explores nationalism as a strategy for self-determination: "collective action designed to render the boundaries of the nation congruent with those of its governance unit" (Hechter, 2000, p. 15). Theorists such as Liah Greenfeld (1992) maintain that nationalism emerges as a bid for status and the maintenance of authority among elite actors; while scholars such as Charles Tilly (1993) and Michael Mann (1993), among many others, proffer nationalism as an ideological complement to state building—that is, that nationalist sentiment must be constructed or invoked to reinforce the authority and legitimacy of the state.

These contrasting positions embody a longstanding tension in nationalist studies between "perennial" or "primordial" views of nationalism and "constructivist" or "instrumentalist" views. The former emphasize the historical and cultural processes by which nations are created. The latter stress that nations are often the product of a self-conscious and manipulative project carried out by elites who seek to secure their power by mobilizing followers on the basis of nationalist ideology. There is obviously much truth to the proposition that nationalist leaders often manipulate the sentiments and identities of their followers. It is also clear that nations are not eternal beings present as such from the beginning of time.

Nationalism is implicated in many forms of social practice, ranging from the benign (singing the national anthem at a sports event or celebrating a national literary figure, for example) to the terrifying and genocidal. The distinction between "civic" and "ethnic" nationalism is sometimes employed to account for these differences. Civic nationalism is said to be rooted in legitimate membership in a constituted political state; members of nations are understood first and foremost through their political identities as citizens. In its "ethnic" form, national identity is defined on the basis of cultural or ethnic criteria distinct from (and often seen as prior to) political citizenship. The distinction is problematic, for several reasons. First, it has sometimes been applied to try to separate "Eastern" from "Western" nationalism, or "organic" from "liberal," usually accompanied by a value judgment of which is the "bad" and which the "good" form. Second, these divisions reinforce the sense that nations can belong to only one category or the other, either as civic nations (of which France, with its longstanding rhetoric of assimilationist civic inclusion, is the classic example) or as ethnic nations (classically represented by Germany). Rather than opposing the two types of nationalism, it is more helpful to ask how the two dimensions of solidarity and identity, and the two sorts of claims to membership and rights, figure and relate to each other in specific national histories. Rogers Brubaker (1992) shows, for example, that both France and Germany receive immigrants at about the same rate and grant them comparable benefits (though Germany does make it harder for them to become citizens). But even the most "civic" of nationalisms demands an account of the particularity of their relationship to the larger world.

What these extraordinarily varied accounts tell us is that understanding nationalism is not a matter of "causal parsimony"; that is, there is no specific cause–effect relationship to be found. Though different factors explain various *contents* of nationalism or *processes* associated with nationalism, they do not explain the *form* of nation or nationalist discourse itself. The common denominator among, say, Japanese economic protectionism, Serbian ethnic cleansing, Quebec separatism, and the way the World Bank collects statistics is the use of a common rhetoric, a *discursive form* that shapes and links all of them, even though it may not offer a full causal explanation of any of them. Nations cannot be defined effectively by empirical measures of

whether they are actually able to achieve sovereignty and to maintain integrity both within their borders and from outside influences and interests, or by whether their culture is perfectly unified or demonstrably ancient. Rather, *nations are constituted largely by the claims themselves,* by the way of talking and thinking and acting that relies on these sorts of claims to produce collective identity, to mobilize people for collective projects, and to evaluate peoples and practices. Nationalism is a way of speaking that shapes our consciousness and is complex enough to generate issues and questions and to compel ongoing debates over what it means and how to think about it. It is a way of thinking about social solidarity, collective identity, and related questions (like political legitimacy) that plays a crucial role both in the production of nationalist self-understandings and in the recognition of nationalist claims by others. As such, nationalism is not about discovering essential traits or identifying specific rules but rather about observing what Wittgenstein called a pattern of "family resemblance": shared features that suggest a similarity of background or development. Indeed, the word "natio," as Elie Kedourie (1993) has pointed out, originally referred to a group of people belonging together by similarity of birth.

In this sense, nationalism has three dimensions. First, there is nationalism as discourse: the production of a cultural understanding and rhetoric that leads people throughout the world to think and to frame their aspirations in terms of the idea of nation and national identity, and the production of particular versions of nationalist thought and language in particular settings and traditions. Second, there is nationalism as project: social movements, state policies, or institutions through which people seek to advance the interests of the collectivity they understand as a nation, usually pursuing in some combination (or in a historical progression) increased participation in an existing state, national autonomy, independence and self-determination, or the amalgamation of territories. Third, there is nationalism as evaluation: political and cultural ideologies that claim superiority for a particular nation; these are often associated with movements or state policies, but need not be. In this third sense, nationalism appears as an ethical imperative: The argument is that national boundaries *ought* to coincide with state boundaries, for example, or that members of a nation *ought* to conform to its moral values, and so on.

All three of these dimensions, whether implicitly or explicitly, figure in efforts to mobilize followers in loyalty to the nation. But they take very different forms depending on the historical and social context of the efforts at hand. Consider, for example, how the idea of national pride, belonging, or obligation can be mobilized by very different leaders for vastly different purposes. Nationalism can be a central pillar of brutal and repressive regimes just as it can be for attempts to overthrow them. It can be invoked by leaders as a form of defense *against* another country—as when Hugo Chávez created a Bolivarian Congress of Peoples to represent "popular, democratic and patriotic forces" in Latin America against the encroachment of American free trade regulation (Kozloff, 2007, p. 144). It

can also be invoked as a rallying claim *for* a country—as when Franklin Delano Roosevelt pledged to provide a "New Deal" for the American people in the midst of the Great Depression, or more recently, when Barack Obama called for public service as part of what it means to be a citizen in modern-day America.

Each of these injunctions to nationalism takes for granted the historical processes that produced relatively consensual national identities, and also typically exaggerates the extent of consensus. The tendency is to label as "patriotism" those cases where people with stable national identities act with pride in their achievements or with justice against external aggression and to condemn as "bad nationalism" the cases in which people struggle with one another over the stabilization of one or another particular definition of national identity. But as Robert Stam and Ella Shohat (2007) observe in their discussion of nationalism and patriotism, "Any critical discussion of patriotism and nationalism inevitably bumps up against the question of national pride. The 'anti' in relation to one country cannot be separated from the 'pro' in relation to another" (p. 3).

Indeed, critiques of both patriotism and nationalism often revolve around the concern that articulating preference for one's own country seems to promote the interests or values of one nation over those of others. But patriotism can be an important dimension of solidarity within countries. It can foster support for laws, welfare projects, and social reforms that entitle all citizens to equal respect from their state. It can encourage mutual recognition and respect, as well as mobilize citizens for a variety of domestic projects. It can also undergird the capacity of citizens to bear up under suffering. Finally, appeals to patriotism by leadership can be mobilized around aspirations for a better future, a fuller realization of shared ideals.

These examples demonstrate how the discourse, project, and ethical injunctions of nationalism can vary depending on the historical and social context. It also helps us see how easy it is to try to separate nationalism into "bad" and "good" types, and why understanding nationalism as a discursive formation helps us overcome the biases inherent in these characterizations.

Nationalism is not just recent; it is one of the definitive features of the modern era. It has been closely linked to the practical power and administrative capacity of states, of capitalism, of global interconnection, and of technological innovation. But it is also crucial to recognize that nationalism works, in part, because national identities and the whole rhetoric of nationalism appear commonly to people as though they were always already there—ancient, or even natural. In the next section, we investigate how this common understanding came about, and why it endures.

State, Nation, and Legitimacy

A theorist of nationalism, Ernest Gellner (1983), has written that nations and states "were destined for one another;

that either without the other is incomplete, and constitutes a tragedy" (p. 6). Historically, however, the process of consolidating states and nations has been far from automatic or instantaneous. Nor was it always easy. Much of what we now think of as the peaceful patriotism or uniform traits of the long-established and prototypically modern Western nations are the result of symbolically and physically violent histories. Not only violence, to be sure: National identity and common histories are also the result of cultural creativity and shared experiences. But we would do well to remember that it is a combination of factors—political, cultural, economic—over long periods of time that have served to establish the hyphen between nation and state, and that even when the hyphen is in place, it is not always settled.

Descending and Ascending Legitimacy

Throughout much of European history, discussions of legitimate rule focused on arguments about divine or natural right, on questions of succession based largely on descent, and on debates about the limits to be imposed on monarchs. Initially, calling certain peoples "nations" carried no particular political significance. It was simply a reference to common origins—whether in terms of language or territory. The medieval Catholic Church recognized the cultural diversity of its various "nations" separately from the political divisions among the Christian monarchs. But after the 14th century, the idea of what constituted a nation changed. Questions of sovereignty began to turn on appeals to the rights or acceptance of the people. Popular uprisings and political theory increasingly relied on the notion that "the people" constituted a unified force, capable not only of rising en masse against an illegitimate state but also of bestowing legitimacy on a state that properly fitted with, and served the interests of, its people. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 confirmed the new principle of a "just equilibrium" among the competing nations of Europe, establishing a framework for seeing sovereignty as secular and religion as private (or essentially domestic) with regard to the relations among sovereigns.

The idea that legitimacy now "ascended" from the people instead of "descending" from divine or natural leaders had earlier roots—including in ancient Greece and Rome and in some of the "tribal" traditions of ancestors of modern Europeans—but it became much more pervasive in the early modern era. It was also decisively shaped by the broad influence of republican thought. Republicanism challenged the arbitrary rights of kings in the name of the common good. The *res publica* referred to things that were necessarily public, shared by right. In this tradition, modern Europe saw itself as heir to the ancient Roman republic, before emperors subjected Rome to their arbitrary will.

A New Notion of the "Public"

Republicanism hinged, crucially, on the notion of public and granted a powerful role to critical public discourse among members of a political community. Though at first "public" discourse was limited to a narrow aristocratic or commercial elite, rising standards of literacy among the people, expanding networks of transportation and communication, and increased economic integration extended the size and potential of public participation. But it was war and revolution—in particular, the English Civil War and the American and French revolutions—that signaled the transformation of modern politics. Not only did these modern revolutions put new people in positions of power but they changed the social organization of political power and the character of social life generally, as Theda Skocpol (1979) has demonstrated.

Key to this transformation was the new conception of the "people" or the "nation" as a single, integrated, and more or less homogeneous unit. It would no longer do to have a nation be made up of dispersed communities or families. Successful politics depended in new ways on culture and society. The opinion that the people of a country must constitute a socially integrated body is crucially implied in Rousseau's notion of the general will. The people, the nation, must be capable of a singular identity and—at least ideally—a singular voice. The nation is thus not simply a static category but a creature of common commitment to the whole and to the principles it embodies. It is as a whole that the nation is distinct from other countries and as a whole that its members have the potential right to self-determination and to a state as singular as they are.

A critical part of the process of forming integrated nations was to make different members of nation-states not only more familiar with each other but actually more similar to each other. Actual contact, such as that among citizen soldiers, hastened this process. A crucial dimension of this was the destruction of highly local crafts in favor of more nationally integrated occupational categories. The introduction of new technology and factory organization facilitated this movement and, indeed, helped put workers not just of different locales but of different nations in similar on-the-job circumstances. Workers were shaped not just by the technical exigencies of their work but also by their participation in national culture.

The phenomenon of national language was part of this integration; and like the other aspects of publicness being discussed here, it is also relatively modern. Historically, Latin was the main language of long-distance and cross-dynastic communication in Europe. Other languages, such as French, were initially international, not national; as Greenfeld (1992) has observed, the French of Paris was the international language of the upper classes hundreds of years before it was the national language of the common people. In much of eastern Europe, the nobility spoke a language peasants could not understand and learned only a smattering of the local languages for giving household orders. It was primarily in the 19th century that speaking "national" languages—like Magyar in Hungary—became a matter of self-definition for elites and encouraged a sense of commonality with the masses. It was in this same era that eastern European scholars began to pursue

linguistic standardization through philological inquiry, the publication of dictionaries, and systemic orthography. Similarly, in France, England, and America, dictionaries and other forms of language standardization became prominent in the 18th and 19th centuries—as the fame of Samuel Johnson and Noah Webster attests.

Civil Society, Markets, and Media

A parallel development that would influence the idea of nation was in discussions of *civil society*. This term, adapted in part from an image of free medieval cities, referred both to the capacity of a political community to organize itself, independently of state power, and to the socially organized pursuit of private ends. This self-organization might be accomplished through discourse and decision making in the public sphere or through the systemic organization of private interests in the economy. The Scottish moralists—most famously Adam Ferguson (1767) and Adam Smith (1998)—emphasized the latter in their account of early capitalist markets. Markets demonstrated, for thinkers like Ferguson and Smith, that the activities of ordinary people could regulate themselves without the intervention of government. Such claims were linked to rejections of the absolute authority of monarchs and assertions of the rights of popular sovereignty.

The idea of national identity superseded many long-standing differentiations among smaller polities (Germany is the paradigmatic example). It also superseded the division between town and country that had been basic for most of history. Here nationalism was closely related to capitalism. The process of creating an integrated nation-state meant converting the peasants of, say, Provence, Languedoc, and Burgundy into Frenchmen, as Eugen Weber (1976) has documented. As Gellner (1983) suggests, this happened partly because industrial growth drew so many peasants into towns and led to the construction of roads and railways integrating small local markets into national ones and making possible a division of labor on a national scale. It also happened partly because of state policies such as systems of education, administration, and taxation.

While capitalism played a central role in sundering certain forms of social connection, it also created new ones. Above all, it created the means for maintaining very indirect social relations on a large scale—not only through the market but also through large administrative organizations like multinational corporations. Capitalism also facilitated and encouraged the development of other forms of communication. Benedict Anderson (2006), for example, has called attention to the crucial role played by "print capitalism" in the development of modern nationalism (see also Habermas [1998]). Early publications such as newspapers, journals, and even novels facilitated nationalism by helping spread nationalist ideology and shared culture. In addition, their very form and the practice of reading them helped reinforce a notion of social interconnection among individuals linked by weak or not very dense social relationships. Thus, as Anderson notes, individual readers of newspapers could imagine themselves engaging in an activity that they shared with thousands or even millions of others. Small-scale businesses, adjuncts usually to the main dramas of capitalism, played an important role in promoting nationalist discourse by providing important settings in which public life could take place: coffeehouses, publishing centers, and so on.

The "Violence" of the State

The formation of modern states was both a matter of expansion, as smaller states gave way in the process of establishing centralized rule over large, contiguous territories, and of intensification, as administrative capacity was increased and intermediate powers weakened. Modern states developed as the primary arenas for popular political participation (and in some cases, the creation of democratic institutions). The state's maintenance of centralized administration and authority over its citizens and activities within its jurisdiction informed Weber's (1946) classic definition of the state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (p. 78).

As we have seen, the state was the single most important factor in changing the form and significance of cultural variations. Indeed, it was precisely because modern states were based on citizens, not subjects, that their cultural politics were so violent. Historical empires were relatively effective at enabling people of different ethnic groups to live together in peace. In and around the Ottoman capital of Istanbul, for example, Jews, Christians, and Muslims lived and traded with each other. But peace was relatively easy because the different groups were not called upon to join in common deliberations about government or public affairs. In processes of cultural assimilation, however, where national culture came to supersede local variation, certain groups were constructed as "authentic" while others were sometimes forgotten, labeled "deviant," or relegated to "minorities."

Extreme and distorted versions of assimilation are acts of ethnic cleansing. Recall the former Yugoslavia: Croats and Serbs drove each other out of their ethnically defined republics. Slovenes—equally ethnically nationalist—had few members of other ethnic groups in their territory and so could become independent without a similarly violent drive for domestic homogeneity. In Bosnia, though, an explicitly multinational state was declared—to the anger of ethnic nationalists, especially advocates of a greater Serbia. The world was outraged at the results. Western leaders and the news media described them as due to the peculiar ancient hatreds characteristic of the Balkan peoples. Parallels could certainly be drawn with the portrayal of the situation in Iraq in recent years.

The World System of Nation-States

No nation-state ever existed entirely unto itself. As Charles Tilly (1993) has shown, European states grew and

intensified their administration in the context of a web of interstate rivalries. These were played out in economic as well as military and diplomatic arenas. Gradually, from the early modern era through the 19th and early 20th centuries, older political organizations like empires, quasi-autonomous principalities, and free cities gave way to a more standardized system. The world was divided into formally equivalent states, each of which was sovereign. Ideally, each of these states represented a single nation, hence the term "nation-state." By the second half of the 20th century, it was clearly anomalous for any nation-state to remain under the explicit political tutelage of another, and where such relations existed, they were commonly subjected to campaigns to undo them.

Most nationalist movements have involved claims to states—either claims to create autonomous states where these do not exist or claims that the nation should govern a state currently in the hands of foreigners or illegitimate rulers. Occasionally nationalists are prepared to settle for special recognition in the constitution of a multinational state. But the discourse of nationalism does not operate only in the direction of people to state; the reciprocal claim is also common. By the 19th century, Europeans thought not only that every nation deserved a state but that each state should represent one nation.

One feature of this new way of conceptualizing sovereignty is the treatment of all nation-states as formally equivalent, whatever their size or power. The equivalence of states is emphasized especially in arenas like the United Nations, not only because the discourse of nationalism predominates but also because attention is paid to the whole system of states at once. New York City may be twice as populous as Eritrea or Norway, but this does not grant it comparable diplomatic status; the United States, not the states or cities within it, relates to each other country as a peer.

At the same time that formal equivalence confers a certain dignity on a nation, this status is unlikely to substitute for power and stature among nations; nationalism can turn to militarism, economic insularity, and concerns for slighted honor. This can of course lead to war, and to a cycle of injuries, resentments, and new international conflicts. But the *domestic* consequences of such international pursuits should not be ignored. International conflict generally, and military mobilization in particular, can help to confer (or enforce) unity on a disparate domestic population, as Linda Colley (1992) has demonstrated in the case of 18th-century Britain. The claim to a singular match between each state and its nation, reinforced by international jealousies, humiliations, and fears, has often been the basis for both repression of difference within the nation (including nonorthodox gender roles) and attempts to exclude or subjugate all "foreign" elements within the state (including the racially or ethnically distinct as well as actual immigrants).

The existence of a world system of states, in sum, exerts a continuing pressure to use nationalist discourse in the justification of claims to sovereignty. Though some analysts predict the dissolution of such states in a postmodern welter of local identities and global corporations, the states do not yet seem to have given up the ghost. It is widely argued that the ability of states to maintain sharp boundaries and to promote internal cultural homogeneity is in decline. It is not clear how such a trend will affect nationalism. On the one hand, it could undermine the extent to which states are likely to be powerful agents of nationalism and reduce the attractions of gaining state power. On the other hand, it could reduce the capacity of states to resist subsidiary nationalisms and might increase the occasions around which nationalist groups form. Even if weakened, however, states are likely to remain the only institutional framework within which to pursue large-scale projects of democracy and self-determination. But at the same time, this world system of states is recalcitrant to new claims for statehood, whether based on integration/ amalgamation or on disintegration/secession. During the 19th-century springtime of nations, it was assumed that the world system of states could readily provide for every nation's freedom. That vision did not last long, but its rhetoric of self-determination still endures, partly because it was founded on the assumption that some clear primordial or historical basis could be found that would settle the question of which were the true nations.

The world system of nation-states is therefore both an incentive to nationalism and a constraint on it. It is an incentive because it remains the primary basis for participation in world affairs. And it is a constraint because its tacit assumption is that the full complement of states is already represented. It therefore takes remarkable events to achieve international recognition for a new state.

Future Directions

Two threads run through contemporary discussions of political and civic leadership in relation to the nation-state. These are the idea of a *cosmopolitan transcendence of nationalism,* often in the name of global civil society, and that of *progressive patriotism,* or the effort to mobilize people in the name of the nation to try to improve the lot of their own countries and better recognize the needs of their fellow citizens. In this section of the chapter, we consider why and how these two ideas emerged and examine the opportunities for and limitations in advancing the principles they embody.

In the wake of 1989, talk of globalization was often celebratory. This attitude was true among more than just anticommunist ideologues, corporate elites, and followers of Francis Fukuyama's pronouncement of the "end of history"; enthusiasm for globalization was also prominent on the Left. Many were eager to proclaim the rise of international civil society as a transcendence of the nation-state and to embrace an ideal of cosmopolitan democracy, where humanity at large could be organized as citizens of the world. This is an attractive but very elusive ideal.

The discourse on globalization is far gloomier in the first decade of the 21st century. Ongoing financial instability has created crises of value—and losses of jobs—to a

degree not seen since the Great Depression. Superpower positions are shifting and, in some cases, offering dangerous demonstrations of power. Awareness of the global vitality of religion is growing, but intolerant fundamentalists seem to thrive disproportionately. Despite new doctrines of active intervention, a host of humanitarian emergencies and local or regional conflicts kill by the tens of thousands and impoverish by the millions. And the dark side of globalization includes the international spread of disease, the global organization of malign movements, and trafficking in women, drugs, and guns.

The enthusiasm for postnational forms of both governance and belonging is understandable. It has been fueled by a growing confidence in global civic society (and potential supports for it, like the Internet). It is also driven by the tragic civil wars and ethnic slaughters of recent years. Not only do these provide extreme examples of the evils associated with ethnicity and nationalism but they also provide spectacles of tragedies that might have been averted had self-interested governments not refused to act—sometimes citing notions of state sovereignty as rationale. And it has resurfaced after 9/11—despite the prominence since that time of national security agendas, heightened religious fundamentalism, and sectionalism. But there are good reasons why nationalism survives— even though nationalist projects are certainly not all good. And there are good reasons to doubt that we are entering a postnational era.

One of the problems with the perspective that sees cosmopolitanism as a transcendence of nationalism is that it positions cosmopolitan projects as inherently more progressive than nationalist ones. Globalization and the coming of postnational and transnational society are often presented as inexorable and unavoidable. European integration, for example, is often sold to voters as a necessary response to the global integration of capital. In Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere, the perspective often put forward is that globalization just "happens" and that governments and citizens must adapt to its steady, forward progression. As we saw above in the case of different forms of nationalism, it is tempting to characterize cosmopolitanism as "good," "forward looking," or "progressive" and nationalism as "bad," "backward," and "regressive." Yet this way of seeing things misses the ways in which nationalism and cosmopolitanism are mutually constitutive. To conceptualize cosmopolitanism as the opposite to nationalism (and ethnicity and other solidarities) is not only a sociological confusion but an obstacle to achieving both greater democracy and better transnational institutions. The challenge is to think through more fully what sorts of social bases have shaped cosmopolitan visions and what sorts of issues need more attention if advances in democracy are to be made.

The project of cosmopolitan democracy, as Daniele Archibugi, David Held, and Martin Köhler (1998) have noted in their writings on this topic, is to create a political order adequate to the actual scale of global interconnections and yet responsive both to the diversity of individuals'

attachments and the ideal of self-governance. It responds not only to the reality of economic integration but also to the ethical challenges posed by globalization. It responds to the limitations of conventional liberal thought, most notably those posed by linking citizenship to national identity. It offers a way of thinking about the obligations all human beings share because new technologies and trading patterns render us all members of a common community of fate. Indeed, part of the attraction of the idea of cosmopolitanism is that it seems to refer at once to a fact about the world and to a desirable response to that fact.

One activity that arises from this perspective, and that unites the potential strength of both nationalism and cosmopolitanism, is to advocate for a more progressive form of patriotism than the one traditionally associated with demonstrations of national sentiment. By "progressive" patriotism advocates mean a greater commitment to national self-improvement and a greater expectation by leadership that citizens will participate in laying the democratic groundwork for debate and dissent. In the United States, recent discussions of progressive patriotism have turned on issues of collective security (in terms of defense, energy, and health care), stronger democratic structures, and more responsible fiscal policies.

Jürgen Habermas (1998) has proposed a particular model for progressive patriotism that he calls "constitutional patriotism": solidarities based on the loyalties of citizens to specific political institutions and commitments rather than to national or communitarian identities. In essence, this notion is a reworking of the idea of civic nationalism, rooted in the claim that people should see themselves as citizens of the world, not just of their own countries, and that their obligations should match the boundaries of world citizenship. Of course, there is a normative appeal in both "constitutional patriotism" and "cosmopolitanism"—but the question that arises here is how either can seem to posit a "thinner" identity than nationalism and still mobilize people in even greater commitments to one another. To work, there must be practical action that extends the social, communicative, political, and economic conditions of public life in a way that transcends nations.

Globalization has not put an end to nationalism—not to nationalist conflicts nor to the role of nationalist categories in organizing ordinary people's sense of belonging in the world. Indeed, globalization fuels a resurgence in nationalism among people who feel threatened or anxious as much as it drives efforts to transcend nationalism with new structures of political-legal organization or thinking about transnational connections. Nationalism still matters, still troubles many of us, but still organizes something considerable about who we are. Whether and how nationalism can mediate peaceful and constructive connections of individuals to the larger world is a crucial question. Nationalism's contributions to social solidarity may never outweigh its frequent violence, yet seeking to bypass nationalism in pursuit of universal ideals may reflect equally dangerous illusions.

Summary

If we are to limit, reform, or even move beyond national-ism, we need to take it seriously. We need to consider the changing meanings of nationalism and the innovations people make in nationalist rhetoric and practice. We need to respect the importance of belonging to nations and other groupings of human beings smaller than humanity as a whole. We need to understand that such belonging has dif-ferent meanings for different people: it inspires some, it protects some, it consoles some, and it makes political opportunities for some.

Not only is nationalism not a moral mistake, it is not vanishing. National identities and loyalties and structures of integration are among the many complications of the actual historical world in which moral decisions must be made. Globalization challenges nation-states and intensi-fies flows across their borders, but it does not automati-cally make them matter less. Because nations matter in varied ways for different actors, it is important to think carefully about how they are produced and reproduced, how they work, and how they can be changed. It matters whether nationalist appeals mobilize citizens for ethnic cleansing, external war, or internal loyalty to regrettable regimes. It matters whether nationalist appeals mobilize citizens for democratic projects, mutual care, or redistrib-ution of wealth. Prior histories of nation making may pre-dispose people toward one sort of project or another, but the projects themselves also make and remake nations. Whatever is made of them, nations matter.

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